Research shows Americans increasingly evaluate immigrants based on whether they are a “political threat.” Partisan sorting is reshaping the boundaries of American belonging.
Dr. Gerardo Martí – June 03, 2026 (re-printed with permission)
May 19, 2026
Back in Spring 2024, a group of right-wing activists traveled to the Darién Gap in Central America, one of the most punishing stretches of jungle on earth, where migrants from dozens of countries make their way northward. The group came to ask questions. “Do you guys like Ilhan Omar?” they asked one man resting at a migrant camp in Panama. “What do you think about Joe Biden?”

These conservative inquisitors, affiliated with Steve Bannon and traveling with Republican House members, were producing videos designed to reinforce a narrative — that the Democratic Party was orchestrating an immigrant invasion to harvest loyal voters. When talking with these far-off migrants who had survived the dangers they had fled, their only concern was: Are you one of us, or one of them?
The scene points to a reality far more pervasive than a media stunt. Researchers find a fundamental shift in how Americans think about immigrants, one that new has profound consequences.
Upending What We Thought We Knew
For decades, scholars and advocates working on immigration and racial equity operated with a relatively stable framework for understanding why Americans accept or reject immigrants. The literature found people acting on two beliefs:
- First, cultural threat: anxieties about whether immigrants would assimilate, whether they would change the cultural composition of neighborhoods and schools, and whether American “ways of life” were threatened.
- Second, economic threat: fears about labor market competition, concerns about welfare costs, and worries about the fiscal burden they would impose.
These two frameworks have shaped policy arguments, advocacy campaigns, and school curricula on diversity for a generation. But a new study recently published in the American Journal of Sociology by Keitaro Okura (Yale University) challenges our understanding in ways that matter enormously for those of us working on race, inclusion, and community thriving.
Okura’s argument, supported by six separate studies across two nationally representative surveys involving more than 3,400 Americans, is that a third force has quietly moved to the center of how Americans evaluate immigrants — political threat.
The concept of political threat is clear, but its implications are not. The new research finds that Americans’ willingness to welcome immigrants, grant them legal status, and view them as deserving members of the national community is now shaped less by where immigrants come from, what language they speak, or how educated they are, and more by whether those immigrants are perceived as future Democrats or future Republicans.
The question at the border has become distinctly partisan. Whose politics will a new immigrant support?
What Americans Believe About Immigrant Politics
Okura asked survey respondents to assess the likely political affiliations of nine immigrant groups, ranging from Mexican and African immigrants to Russian, Chinese, Cuban, German, Indian, and Muslim immigrants, as well as those crossing the Southern border.
The results? Regardless of political party affiliation, Americans broadly assume that most immigrants are future Democrats. Specifically, Mexican, African, and border migrants are perceived as overwhelmingly likely to vote Democratic. However, Russian immigrants are viewed as likely Republicans. Chinese and Cuban immigrants land somewhere in the middle, with Americans more divided on where their political loyalties fall.
Even more, despite years of right-wing media insisting that immigrants are a Democratic electoral surety, it is actually Democrats who most strongly believe this truism. Although Republicans are somewhat less likely than Democrats to characterize them as future Democrats, their political anxiety is sharper because most Republicans believe that most Americans are fellow Republicans, while only a minority of immigrants are.
The perceived threat to electoral politics cuts differently across the two parties. For Republicans, continued immigration represents a permanent shift against their interests. For Democrats, immigrants are anticipated to become allies.
Politics Beats Education Level, Language, National Origin
This is where the most significant finding of the research comes in.
A landmark study from 2015 by Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins found a “hidden American immigration consensus” favoring well-educated immigrants in skilled professions. It said that, aside from partisan squabbling, Americans across the political spectrum preferred the same immigrant: credentialed, English-speaking, and professionally employed.
Okura’s research dismantles that consensus. Using an experimental design where respondents evaluated hypothetical immigrant groups along six attributes simultaneously — national origin, gender, English proficiency, education, occupation, and political party affiliation — political alignment was the dominant factor.
Forced to choose between two stylized profiles, 61 percent of Democrats and 53 percent of Republicans said they preferred admitting a politically aligned immigrant, even with only a high school degree, working in service employment, and with limited English ability, in comparison with a politically misaligned immigrant with a graduate degree, a white-collar job, and high English proficiency.
Even more, the study reveals that Americans’ judgments about whether an immigrant is “legal” or “illegal” are not fixed assessments but socially constructed, shaped by prior attitudes about which groups are welcome.
Okura tested this using the case of Venezuelan migrants and Temporary Protected Status, a legal designation for people fleeing armed conflict or disaster. When respondents were informed that Venezuelans had voted heavily for Donald Trump in 2024, Democratic respondents were significantly more likely to support ending their TPS protections and to classify those who overstayed their status as “undocumented.” In contrast, Republicans became more sympathetic to Trump-supporting Venezuelan migrants and were less likely to call them undocumented.
Their legal status did not change, but as their political framing did, the assessment of their deservingness to stay in the United States shifted.
This pattern can have real consequences in our current moment. Following the pattern Okura identified: immigrants who are politically misaligned are repositioned, in public rhetoric and in policy action, as undeserving, suspect, or “illegal” regardless of their actual legal status. Rhetoric denouncing illegal immigration can function as a veiled expression of political discomfort, a signal of response to political misalignment that is obscured by the language of policy and law.
What This Means for Congregations and Communities
At the heart of thriving congregations and communities is what sociologists broadly label “bridging social capital,” relationships that cross social distances rather than only strengthening bonds within existing groups. Immigration is one of the most powerful engines of that kind of bridging. Parishes, mosques, temples, and churches that build relationships across immigrant and native-born communities become more resilient, more creative, and more deeply rooted in their neighborhoods than those that stay within their homogenous cultural boundaries.
Yet political sorting is now undermining exactly this kind of bridging. Pastors and ministry leaders must recognize that sentiments toward immigrant welcome are operating inside a partisan sorting machine. In polarized communities, welcoming Haitian, Central American, and West African migrants increasingly triggers assumptions about a congregation’s partisan loyalties. When people evaluate their neighbors through the lens of partisan threat, the impulse to build these new relationships weakens.

This does not mean for congregations to retreat from serving these populations. It means that those who lead communities of faith must be prepared to articulate clearly why welcome is not partisan allegiance, and to hold that line when the pressure comes.
A Word to Parents, Teachers, and Small Business Owners
For parents raising children in diverse communities, this research carries a particular message. Children quickly pick up cues, and they are learning, from the people around around them, to evaluate people through a partisan filter. The question is not only whether your child has friends from different racial or ethnic backgrounds but also whether they are developing the habits of mind that resist the reduction of humans to political categories.
For teachers, the research offers both a challenge and a resource. The challenge is to help students understand how legal status is socially constructed and politically contested, not just “legally” defined. The resource is the evidence itself: Okura’s research showing that a majority of Americans prefer a politically aligned immigrant over a politically misaligned one is a powerful insight for the classroom. The pattern revealed in this research invites students to examine their own assumptions about what they think they value in others.
For small business owners, particularly those in diverse communities, the implications are immediate. Immigrant labor is not a partisan issue in practice, whatever political rhetoric claims. The baker, the home care worker, the construction subcontractor, and the hotel housekeeper are people whose status is increasingly precarious because political sorting as described in this research make their presence feel threatening to some portion of the electorate. Business communities have interests in stability, predictability, and a functioning workforce. Those interests are poorly served by immigration politics driven by perception of partisan threat rather than policies that provide stability and a reliable flow of capable workers.
A New Partisan Challenge
Benedict Anderson famously described the nation as an imagined community held together by a sense of deep connections with strangers we will never meet. We feel solidarity with fellow citizens, he argued, not because we know them, but because we imagine ourselves as sharing something fundamental.
Okura’s research shows how this imagined fellowship is broken along partisan lines. Americans in 2026 may feel more solidarity with a foreign-born stranger who they believe shares their politics than with an American-born neighbor who does not. For those of us committed to racial justice, to the thriving of communities of color, to the dignity of immigrant families and the neighbors they have become, this is not an abstract sociological observation.
The welcome extended to one immigrant, and withheld from another, is now less about race or language or culture. It is about whether they belong to our political tribe. That is a new problem. And it demands a new kind of intervention.

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Sources
The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants
Connect with Dr. Gerardo Martí
Gerardo Martí on Substack: American Blindspot: Race, Religion, Power, and Social Change
Gerardo Martí on Bluesky

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